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I. Introduction 
A potential game changing element of future exploration may be the ability to perfonn in-space assembly and servicing of spacecraft. Future exploration missions are likely to require some fonn of in-space assembly 
similar to the International Space Station (ISS) to assemble components for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit 
(LEO). The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was designed to be serviced by the Space Shuttle and has demonstrated 
the significant benefits this capability provides, including correction of the original optics, replacement of failed 
components, and upgrades to the science instruments and capabilities. Future space exploration could benefit from 
the lessons of HST. For example, if the vehicles developed for human exploration provided the capability to capture 
and service other spacecraft, future generations of science missions could rely on these capabilities to provide 
similar benefits to those realized by the HST. Additionally, the ability to service, repair, or refuel elements of a 
system-of-system exploration infrastructure would significantly enhance reliability and functionality. 
Flight dynamics and guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) capabilities are essential to enable future 
spacecraft servicing applications, including providing the capability to rendezvous with and capture the spacecraft to 
be serviced, controlling attitude of the mated configurations, and repositioning/reboosting the combined 
configurations. To achieve these capabilities significant development has been conducted over the past twenty years. 
These efforts include the development of the GN&C necessary to service the Hubble Space Telescope with the 
crewed Space Shuttle, the development of GN&C for robotic servicing for the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) Orbital Express (OE) demonstration and significant development for the Hubble Robotic 
Servicing and Deorbit Mission (HRSDM), and the DARPA SUMO project. Although, these efforts have 
demonstrated many of the capabilities necessary for future demonstration missions, new capabilities may provide 
benefits to future servicing concepts. 
This paper will provide a summary of the GN&C capabilities developed for several of these recent servicing 
missions. The critical new capabilities developed and demonstrated will be reviewed, and important lessons learned 
from these missions will be summarized. Finally, the paper will place these developments and lessons learned in 
context of potential future servicing concepts and provide potential technologies that could be developed. 
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II.. Space Shuttle Servicing Experience 
Following initial deployment of the HST, five servicing visits were perfonned by the Space Shuttle and 
attending crew. These missions were highly successful at replacing or repairing failed or outdated components 
(science instruments, reaction wheels, solar arrays, computers, batteries, thennal blankets, etc) many of which were 
not initially intended for servicing. However, the combined HST design, access to the inner compartments of the 
bus, ground planning, tool design, training, the agility of humans in space, and the capability of the Space Shuttle 
allowed for the repair, upgrade, and life extension of HST. 
As with Shuttle experience and specifically HST servicing it is clear that initial design requirements typically do 
not consider all the possibilities and opportunities of the future. The Shuttle design only included six vernier jets to 
provide temporary rotational control for support of microgravity payloads. The Shuttle's 38 primary jets at 14 
different positions provided redundancy and control for six degrees of freedom. In practice, the vernier jets are used 
almost exclusively for support of payloads primarily for the cause of minimizing imparted loads. Although there was 
initially no vernier translation the Shuttle program has found cleaver means to use the vernier jets for altitude 
adjustments (reboost). The lack of vernier redundancy or translation capability has incurred expense to the Shuttle 
program and HST project alike. 
Likewise the design of HST imposed complication and costs that could have been avoided. The support structure 
for attaching the HST to the Shuttle did not adequately isolate the HST from the loads imparted during the reboost 
of HST. Several modifications, mitigations and upgrades all acted to make this better over time. Second, the initial 
Solar Array (SA) design did not tolerate loads imparted by the Shuttle's control system. This concern was resolved 
with installation of new rigid SA Ill's during the Servicing Mission SM-3B. 
A. HST Reboost 
One of the primary services provided by the Shuttle to HST is altitude maintenance bums (reboosts) imparted to 
overcome the effects of orbital decay. Changes in configuration of the HST and increased capability of the Shuttle 
made this task easier over time. The first reboost was executed with the HST tilted forward at 45 degrees on the 
Berthing and Positioning System (BAPS) and used the Shuttle's - X primary jets. Servicing mission 2 used manual 
techniques to continually fire the Shuttle's vernier jets to achieve the required delta-V. For the later servicing 
mission 3B and 4, the automatic reboost capability that was developed for the ISS was utilized. 
For STS-32/SM-l, much work was done to explore all translation options against plausible uncertainties with the 
objective to minimize impact to the HST. At the time, use of the Shuttle vernier jets was not considered as the 
Shuttle Digital AutoPilot did not support a translation mode that could be commanded directly. Preflight analysis 
eventually yielded a conclusion that the lowest imparted loads to the HST pivot interface using the Shuttle's primary 
jets would be achieved by using the -X (forward firing) jets and the HST pivoted at 45 degrees. The biggest factor 
in this conclusion was the desire to avoid resonating the HST pitch pivot mode at 0.10-0. 11 Hz. The more natural 
choice using + X (aft fifing) jets had thrust aligned nearly through the composite Center of Gravity (CG) that would 
result in slow attitude excursions and thus low frequency rate limit corrections. Caution then dictated that the 
analysis consider the attitude rate correction firings to align to the HST pivot mode resulting in near violation of the 
limit. The -Xjet thrust was less aligned with the CG resulting in a higher frequency of attitude rate corrections that 
were not expected to resonate the HST pivot mode. In practice, the flight reboost yielded even higher pitch torque 
from the - X translation flfings than expected which caused not only rate corrections but attitude deadband 
corrections as well. The performance discrepancy was traced to discovery that the self impingement of the Shuttle -
X jets was incorrectly modeled in the Shuttle Operational Data Book (SODB). Post flight analysis detennined that 
the attitude deadband firings during the STS-32 reboost were of higher frequency than the expected rate corrections 
and did not significantly contribute to the loads. As a result of the self impingement modeling error discovery the 
Shuttle K-loads and all future simulation models were updated to accurately represent the -X jet flfings. 
By the time of the next visit to HST, STS-82, a new concern had been identified. The solar arrays on the HST 
were taught to the extent that the bistem supports bent in opposite directions to cause a twist in the blanket support 
structure, see Figure I - HST Solar Arrays ll{left) lll(right)~1re 2 HST SolaF--Arrays Il(letl) lll(rigkt). A new 
observation criteria and constraint was placed on the Shuttle control in servicing of the HST. All Shuttle control, 
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including reboost, was to be exercised such that the peak to peak deflection at the tip of the SA bi-stems would be 
less than 2 inches. Clearly the -X reboost that had been used for servicing mission 1 would not satisfy this criteria. 
A new approach was developed whereby the two aft left and right vernier jets were deselected such that a rotation 
yaw command to Shuttle control would yield two down ftring aft jets and one down firing forward jet. It was 
therefore possible to achieve a translation in Shuttle -Z direction by manually commanding a yaw rotation. As a yaw 
command yields yaw rate, pure translation was achieved by toggling between plus and minus yaw to keep rotation 
rates and attitude excursions within reasonable boundaries. In practice the vernier yaw toggling technique resulted in 
only slight violations of the 2" tip deflection criteria while achieving reboost. The manual yaw procedure was 
executed four times during SM-2 achieving a total delta-V of 8 nautical miles (NM) achieving a 334x32 I NM orbit. 
Figure 1i - HST Solar Arrays ll(left) IIJ(right) 
Later in the Shuttle program, an automatic reboost capability was added that allowed specific selection of jets to 
fire to accommodate translation. With this new capability, all four down firing vernier jets could be selected to fire 
simultaneously negating the need for manual yaw commanding procedure used for SM-2. The automatic reboost 
capability was used for the final two servicing missions to HST, STS~l09/SM-3B and STS-125/SM-4. 
B. HST Design 
As mentioned before, the concern over bistem integrity of the SA imposed a less than 2" tip deflection criteria 
that resulted in significant analysis and constraints to Shuttle control. A top to bottom review of all the Shuttle 
control system effects whether commanded or incurred was conducted. Additionally, an exhaustive survey of jet 
perfonnance from previous missions was conducted to assure that the forcing functions used to evaluated loads to 
the HST were adequately conservative. The result was a list of recommendations to soften the impact of the Orbit 
Digital Auto Pilot (OAP) to the HST. Figure 2- OAP Recommendations to minimize tip deflectionsFigure 3 DAP 
~cemmeAdatiens 10 1fliflimi7.e tip deAeet-ioos presents the table of recommendations that was derived to address the 
tip defection concern. 
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Problem Solution 
Maneuver Cycles \\iden Deadbands (1.0->3.0) 
Lower maneuver rate (0.2->0.l or lower) 
Use small rate limit (0.02) 
OPS mode recall A void recalls dwing aitical OPS 
Select FREE drift dwinsr: recall. 
Shon maneuvers post Avoid during aitical OPS. 
FREE drift Lower maneuver rate 
Maneuver startup a.nc Lowermaneuvc:r rue. (0.2->0.l or lower) 
terminate ttansie.nts. 
Figure IJ.. DAP Recommendations to minimize tip deflections 
The recommendations drove new procedure development, elevated training costs and raised the risk of mistakes 
being made. Figure 3 - OAP Recommendation and Constraints~~ndation and CeAstraiAts 
presents the orbit DAP constraints matrix for Remote Manipulator System (RMS) operations citing Deadbands 
(DB), Rate Limits (RL), Maneuver Rates (MR), RMS modes Position Hold (PH), or Brakes On to mitigate concerns 
with SA tip deflections. 
R.\lS Braim 0~ R.\IS Position Hold R.\IS Brakts On JUIS Posldon Hold 
nu:s \'RCS Alt Tall Only • .\JtTaUOnly 
DB ~l des DB ~l dtC l Jus, 0.08 pwu l j cb, 0.08 p11he 
'.\IR ~ 0.1 dtc/uc llR ~ 0.1 dec/uc delay 7.Ssrc delay 7.5uc 
'.\IR• 0.05-4.1 d,111 llR • 0.05-4.1 dcc/1 
RL • 0.1 dec/s RL • 0.1 dt!fl 
CAP-REL lip deflections Tip detlcctions Tip deflections Tip deflections 
Moderate to High Low Moderate Low 
CA•l RL 2: O.OS deg'1 RU:0.05 deg,"s DB•3 deg DB2: 3 deg 
DB2:2 deg MJ. • 0.1 dcgis Ml!.S0.1 deg•a 
Pre-Rdease Tip ddltctlOnl Tip deflections Tip deflections Tip deflections 
(Du dl>and Moderate Lo ... - Moderate Lo"'· 
Collapse) R.L2: 0.0$ deg', RL • 0 .03 dcg-'s Not 1tcommmdcd DB•2 deg 
DB•2 deg DB•0.5 deg MJt • 0.05 deg I 
CA•l MR•0.02~ dc1t'1 MR • 0.024 
Ext Park Tip deflections Tip dttlcctioni Tip dtfltctions Tip dtfltctions 
l\lodcratc to High Lo\\· l\loderate Lo\\· 
CA-l RL~0.05 dcg'1 RL i 0.05 deg:s DB 2: 5 dtg DB~ 5 dtg 
DBi2dc, !>IR• O.I degs l\llt ~ 0.1 de1t•sec: 
Honr Tsp deilecuons Tip dethctions lip deflections lip deflections 
Moderate to High Low Moderate Low 
CA•l RL i 0.10 deg'• RL<!:O.OSdeg•s DBiSdeg DB<!: 5 deg 
DB2: 2 deg l\llt • 0.1 deg:s MR~O.l deg 'sec 
Avoid if PH Tip deflection risk 
Avaibblt acctpttd by GSFC 
DB-attitude dudband Acctptablc dtilt ctions ~ 2 inclics 
RL • rate limit Lo\\· deilecbons: 2--l inches 
MR• manell\·er ratt !,(odente dt ilcctions: 4-S inches 
CA • CNTL ACCEl. Hillh deflections: >S inches 
Figure J 4 - DAP Recommendation and Constraints 
The suspect SA's were replaced with more rigid SAlll's during STS-109/SM-3B; this design change benefited 
analysis and procedures for STS-125/SM-4. 
C. Observations 
To be successful at robotic servicing in the future, we must draw on the lessons learned from our experiences in 
human attended servicing as well as our robotic experience. The tools and methods developed for repairing or 
replacing critical spacecraft components will have to be improved and employed without the aid of on-site humans. 
This will create new a11d unique challenges in spacecraft design both for the serviced and servicing vehicles. 
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In hindsight, more foresight of potential services provided by the Shuttle and tolerance by HST to servicing 
vehicle could have avoided the complication and costs associated with HST servicing. This lesson should therefore 
be applied during the conception and design of new spacecraft. Spacecraft design in the future at a minimum should 
not arbitrarily preclude or block capability and should consider accommodating servicing from current and projected 
capabilities. 
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. I 
m. Hubble Robotic Servicing and Deorbit Mission 
Following the Columbia disaster in 2003, NASA detennined it was unsafe to send a human crew to perfonn the 
final servicing mission to the HST. To avoid the loss of the HST, either due to gradual decay of its orbit or 
additional failure of its components, an effort was initiated to study concepts for a robotic servicing mission. In 
October 2004, NASA fonned a team with the GSFC, MD Robotics, and Lockheed Martin to develop a robotic 
servicing mission. The Lockheed Martin led team included Aerojet providing propulsion systems, Ball Aerospace 
supporting the science instruments, Draper Laboratory leading the GN&C development, Jackson and Tull 
supporting HST systems, MD Robotics providing sensors and robotics, and Orbital Sciences providing berthing 
interface support. The Hubble Robotic Vehicle (HRV) consisted of the Ejection Module (EM), Deorbit Module (OM 
or HRVDM), AR&D systems, and robotic servicing components, shown in Figure 4 • Hubble Robotic Vehicle[Web 
Page]r'igure 5 Hubble Robotic Vehiele[Wee Page]. The EM provided storage of the science instruments, 
interfaced to the robot systems and provided communications, propulsion and reaction wheels. The DM was 
responsible to provide the Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking (AR&D) and the capability for deorbit at the end 
of HST life . 
Figure~ - Hubble Robotic Vehicle[Web Page] 
The ambitious mission concept (see Figure 5 HRSDM Conc~pt of OperationsFigure G HRSDM Concept ef 
Operations) required the HRV to rendezvous and capture the HST, including in the event of an uncontrolled HST, 
perform a hard mate with the HST through the capture bars at the base of the HST, and then perfonn a series of 
complex robotic servicing operations using the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator originally developed for the 
ISS. Following completion of the servicing operations, the EM would demate from the HST, separate, and perform a 
controlled reentry/disposal. The OM would remain attached to the HST providing the capability to reboost and then 
deorbit the HST following completion of its science mission. The focus of the remainder of this section will be on 
the flight dynamics and GN&C functions of the HRSDM concepts and the technologies developed to support the 
complex mission requirements. The HRSDM concept provided a challenging set of requirements including: 
• Rendezvous and capture with a sensitive, high-value spacecraft 
• Rendezvous and capture with a potentially tumbling/passive spacecraft 
• Robotic capture with a manipulator 
• Automated docking to three-bar mechanism 
• Single fault tolerance for reliability, including dual independent mating methods 
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CommlHlonlng 
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Launch 
EM Ejection 
Reboost 
Capture 
Science Ops 
Figure ~6 HRSDM Concept of Operations 
A. HRVDM System Architecture 
De-Orbit I Dl•posal 
5 mla Cellbratlon Bum 
so lull pertgff 
The primary functions of the HRVDM were to provide the capability for rendezvous and capture and end·of.)ife 
deorbit. The GN&C functional architecture is provided in Figure 6 • GN&C Functional ArchitectureFig1:1re 7 
GN&G F1:1Reti0Aal Arel-liteeture. A key element of the mission was selection of the sensor suite for AR&D. 
Although the HST was designed to be serviced by the Space Shuttle, it was not designed for cooperative AR&D; 
therefore, the sensor suite had to function without the benefit of cooperative target features such as reflectors. 
Additionally, the mission included requirements to rescue a disabled or tumbling HST, requiring that the sensor 
suite also provide full pose (relative position and attitude measurements). The pose algorithms were required to 
identify the initial orientation of a tumbling HST. Figure 7 · GN&C Sensor SuiteF'igure 8 G~l&C Senser Suite 
provides the sensor suite selected for the robotic mission. The suite consisted of a series of LIDAR and optical 
sensors. Image processing algorithms were to be employed to utilize known features of the HST to determine pose. 
A critical element of the sensor capabilities was the acquisition range for the LIDAR sensor. Longer range 
acquisition provides adequate time for sensor performance assessment and adequate incorporation of sensor 
measurements into the navigation system prior to initiating the bums necessary to bring the HRVDM within 
proximity to the HST. 
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GN&C Functional Architecture 
Sensor 
Natural 
Feature 
Camera 
Laser 
Camera 
LIDAR · 
HRVDM C&DH Processor 
M i<~Hm Mgr . Sequencer 
. . . ·~ 
Status Mod1nJ1 
HRVDM GN&C Software Component 
RawDaia 
&Swus Moding 
lti614h&ii 
MM,&M 
UifflM 
Figure §;I- - GN&C Functional Architecture 
Figure 18 - GN&C Sensor Suite 
B. HRVDM Capture Operations 
Capture of the HST was a mission critical function of the HRSDM. Two independent capture methods were 
incorporated, both direct docking to the servicing towel bars at the base of the HST and grapple via a robotic 
manipulator similar to the Shuttle robot arm. The GN&C mission trajectory concept was developed to rendezvous 
with the HST and place the HRVDM into safety ellipse orbit in proximity to the HST. This passively safe orbit 
provided the necessary· time in proximity to 'the HST to determine its orientation in the event it had lost power and/or 
control. Nominal capture of the HST followed a profile very similar to the Shuttle HST profile. 
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In the event of the need to capture a tumbling HST, the onboard optical systems would be used to determine the 
relative orientation between the two spacecraft. Once the orientation of the HST had been determined, an approach 
trajectory would be determined by the ground to align the HRVDM orientation with the HST at the appropriate time. 
The HRVDM would then be command to perform a Constant Line of Site (CLOSR) approach to the HST, Figure 8 • 
CLOSR Guidancef ig1:1re 9 CL08R Guidatt€e. The CLOSR guidance was a new capability developed to support 
the HRSDM. 
lnlloal APJ>IMCh 
S h<~:lOm 
_j 
+R._ 
APPC91Cb to 89Seltloq UosaotroUt4 HST 
• Prt.Jkt, polnl on lh< lniciol APf'tOIIC.h Sphere ( IA.~) Lhat -.111 ol1p H.RV 
., Ith the Captur. Ax11 Cl""AJ, ( 'nit ,1 l• ltull Appl'\Ml(h HolJ t lAM) p...._ 
• Oo ATP • ..tc.,....11hc ~r,o, t ltr.pu{SE>• the opprop,IMc llfflC 1.nd 
IMl'lnl\tr w, d'lc IA.JI polnc 
• kct1\IIII" out'M"" IA~ durK1J the tronir~, co'~ IAH PoJ.nt. 
• At IAH.. null t:.l"CIIU'-ltOU.Ol rute" ttlalivc to HST C'f Md 11.l1t1ion t ttp. 
• \\'hna the U~T C"A ""4"""'b' the IAH f"Otn,. •l•fft Vl'lfl • 'tit'f anJ 
111•0on1ttp urKt1 ATf' b n,nl ffllll'ICV\"ff. 
• On ATP. pctbm ttf'M&ht-hnc (m IIST bod) &a,n.c) Oppn,M'h from 1he 
Apc,Moch fnklMiiM CA1) pnlne IO IOm Hold Pohn "'hllc ali1n.tn1 1U n c• 
.,._..,_Mlnl..ccr, 
•Motnt•tn lOm tlP • nh.•U &.,c• oha,ncd until ATr b r tn..tt Approoch. 
•t"ltt ATP fM Flnl)I Arpn«h l nr11a1f.M CFAf>,. pctf.trn1 llU\MJ M•hnc 
opp"*'h k• I m C•r uo1tt lk>ld CC..'li) roint. nwnu.inlnll 11hJM'ffl' ,.,, ull 
&,c.t.. and liC.OCWWI keep. 
• Al CH pomc.. MIU tJI rclach • ,.kt. Md ,1.11t1on 1.«p. A0cs d 1Nblied (Of 
n,ye QphJtt. tN\lllc,(.11 rnJ.n1 111 cUMNlcJ for dlrttt dockina ) 
•lO Mwo, . RcvE 
Figure ,!!9 - CLOSR Guidance 
Both of the capture techniques imposed stringent performance requirements on the GN&C. The capability for 
the control system to precisely align aJI three towl bars simultaneously allowed for minimal control margins. 
Additionally, precise control of the HRVDM base was required to assure that the tip of the robotic arm was 
maintained adequately within its capture box prior to initiating automatic capture operations, given the significant 
offset from the vehicle center of gravity to the tip of the robotic arm. Figure 9 - Sample Capture Control System 
Perfom1ancefigure H) Sample Capture Cantrel System Perfer~ provides a sampling of the control system 
performance. 
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x 10·) 5.---- .......-----,--- -,--- --,.----, 
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Figure 2.J-0 - Sample Capture Control System Performance 
C. HRVDM Mission Management 
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A final element of the HRVDM GN&C system was the development of concepts and software for automated 
mission management. The concept chosen was for the onboard system to automatically execute a series of tasks 
preselected by the ground operators. In this fashion the ground would remain in control of the overall mission 
planning functions, while the onboard system was responsible for automatic execution of the necessary activities to 
perfonn the desired tasks. Additionally, the onboard system incorporated the necessary onboard fault protection 
algorithms to monitor the perfonnance of the GN&C as it proceeded with the mission and detennine if an anomaly 
had occurred and safe the vehicle. Unlike typical satellite systems, sating the vehicle was mode dependent and at 
times complex. The most significant complexity was resolving the time sequences and priorities for actions should a 
problem occur during the final mating operations. Figure 10 - Mission Manager ArchitectureFig11re 11 Mission 
Manager Arehiteeture provides the mission manager architecture. 
Ground Uplinked THkllat 
T1sk1nd 
Command 
Stqutnelng 
Ptndln T Task llsts are slOred on-boanl 
Idle Tl Slot 2 
Idle Tl slot 3 
ldla Tl Slot 4 
Idle TL Slot 5 
Abort 
Decision 
Logie 
I NotGN&C ! status 
HST .Colllalon 
Oellcllon 
Algorllhm. . , .. . 
Figure I ().l..J. - Mission Manager Architecture 
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IV. Orbital Express 
OE was an on-orbit flight test program that successfully demonstrated autonomous rendezvous and capture 
(AR&C) without assistance from the ground or target satellite. Multiple refueling demonstrations were also 
perfonned, prior to initial orbital separation of the two spacecraft, and following each of 5 captures. A robotic ann 
transferred a battery back-and-forth between spacecraft, and an operational computer was removed and replaced. 
These operations were demonstrated individually and in combination, without ground assistance. 
OE was managed by DARPA, with additional sponsorship by NASA. Boeing Advanced Systems was prime 
contractor and funded new technologies in vision-based satellite tracking, advanced guidance, and autonomous 
navigation. 
A. Objectives and Technologies 
Satellite servicing can include replacement of failed components and replenishment of depleted propellant. The 
servicer may also provide orbital assistance, such as reboost or attitude control of an attached satellite. It is a costly 
investment for a company to pursue a new line of satellites built with the design and interfaces necessary to 
accommodate these operations. That investment can be a showstopper if it carries a real or perceived risk of mission 
success, due to cost and technical difficulties involved in executing AR&C and servicing operations. OE targeted the 
technologies needed to eliminate these risks, then proved them in the only laboratory where true validation can 
occur - in earth orbit. Thus, the technical risks of AR&C, component change-out, refueling, and orbital control were 
reduced; paving the way to a new breed of government and commercial satellites with servicing in mind. OE 
program objectives, autonomous technologies, and final schedule are summarized in 
Fhn1re 11 - OE Developed and Flight-Tested Technologies from Late 2000 to July 2007Figure 12 06 
Developea aREi f:light Test~EI Teelmologies A-om Late 2000 lo July ?007. 
~ i:jPhue I: Operattonal Sy1te111 Concept f'eulblllty 
Phase II: Advanced Technology Demon,1r1tlon (~Wi~'$:W:~~¥;1MVt# @ 
Launch: 9 Much 2007 (UTC)0 
f'lls,ht Demonstration, 0 
Vehlcl11 Decommlnloned: 22 July 2007 0 
Figure!!~ - OE Developed and Flight-Tested Technologies from Late 2000 to July 2007 
During mated operations, OE focused on systems, software, and interfaces for satellites designed for servicing. 
While the robotic arm and certain subsystems can be adapted to fixing or refueling existing satellites, that was not a 
purpose for the program. For example, the arm software and end effector required a compatible grapple fixture and 
12 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
target plate on the client satellite to perfonn capture. Grapple fixtures were needed on the replaceable battery and 
computer, and the propellant transfer system was designed from the ground-up as matched set on servicer and client 
(or fuel depot, depending on direction of Hydrazine flow). 
Unmated operations were not constrained by such a limitation. While the Advanced Video Guidance Sensor 
(A VGS) did, in fact, require client-side retro-reflectors, other sensors carried a requirement to support rendezvous 
from long range to capture without dedicated design features built into the client satellite'. This was accomplished 
largely with Boeing-developed algorithms contained in the Vision-based Software for Track, Attitude, and Ranging 
(Vis-STAR), which computes azimuth, elevation, and range to the client. It also discerns roll, pitch, and yaw angles, 
provided the client has sufficient natural features. This approach differs from space shuttle dockings with the 
International Space Station (ISS), given ISS navigation aids in the fonn of retro-reflectors and a target cross. 
However, it is consistent with early shuttle missions that approached and captured non-cooperative satellites in 
existing orbits. Altogether different from shuttle, however, DARPA levied a requirement for the OE servicer to 
perform unmated operations entirely on it's own, with no one onboard and the ground behaving in a monitor and 
override mode, only (during periods with ground communications). 
B. Spacecraft 
The OE flight segment consisted of two spacecraft that were mated, stacked, and launched aboard a United 
Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Space Launch Complex 41, on 8 March 
2007. OE and four secondary payloads made up the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Space Test Program 1 
(STP-1). 
Boeing served as OE prime contractor, and designed and manufactured the chaser spacecraft, Autonomous Space 
Transport Robotic Operations (ASTRO), including the end-to-end guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) 
system. Ball Aerospace produced the Next Generation Servicable Satellite (NextSat), which served roles as both a 
satelJite in need of repair and commodities depot (Figure 12 - ASTRO Views of NcxtSat during AR&C Exercise 
#4figure 14 ASTRO Views eHle.'\tSat dl!ri11g AR&C e!(ercise #4). 
Figure I 2-14 • ASTRO Views of NextSat during AR&C Ex~rcise #4 
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Four other subcontractors participated on the OE team: 
• Northrop Grumman Space Technology- Fluid Transfer and Propulsion Subsystem (FT APS) 
• · MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates - Robotic arm 
• Starsys Research Corporation - Soft capture mechanism 
• Draper Laboratory - Onboard mission manager software 
ASTRO and NextSat were deployed into a 492 x 492 km orbit at 46° inclination. Ground control was conducted 
at the AFRL Research, Development, Test. and Evaluation Support Center (RSC) at Kirtland Air Force Base in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. An engineering support room was established at the Boeing facility in Huntington 
Beach, California, along with a rendezvous support room at Boeing Tower 2 in Houston, Texas. 
C. Mission 
An on-orbit test plan evolved during the six development years preceding flight, which combined many types 
and directions of rendezvous into seven AR&C exercises. These were intended to validate autonomous approach, 
circumnavigation, stationkeeping, capture, and departure for a wide variety of conceptual orbits and servicing 
missions. 
• Rendezvous from behind and in front of the client, from distances up to 410 km 
• Stable orbit and co-elliptic trajectories 
• Two different stationkeeping algorithms, demonstrated at various sides and ranges (4 km, 1 km, 500 m, 120 m, 
30 m, 10 m, and 10 cm) from the client 
• Elliptical (± I20x60 m) and near-circular (100 m) flyaround inspection of client at multiple orbital rates (Ix and 
3x} 
• Day and night approach to, and capture of, the client in solar inertial (three times), +V-Bar, and -R-Bar 
attitudes 
• Direct capture (3), and grapple/berth (2) of the client 
• Day (2) and night (3) captures over range of solar beta angles (3° to 48°) 
• Ground (AFSCN) and orbiting (TDRSS) communications access 
• Onboard-commanded abort during approach (10 m range) 
The test plan was a flexible template intended for modification as the flight unfolded, in response to real-time 
results. Changes to the flight plan were, in fact, implemented, following issues encountered during the second 
AR&C exercise. Those issues resulted in an unintended expansion of exercise #2 and check-off of additional AR&C 
objectives, allowing a reduction in the number of exercises from seven to five. ASTRO motion relative to NEXTSat 
during the relatively complex Exercise #5 rendezvous is shown in Figure 13 - Exercise #5 Actual/On board In-
Plane Rendezvous Tra jectoryf'ig1:1re 15 exercise #5 Act1:1ab'Onboard In PlaRe Rendez1101:1s Trajectory, and 
proximity operations in 
Figure 14- Exercise #5 Actual/Onbonrd In-Plane Proximitv Operations Trajectoryf'igw:e 16 fixerei se #5 
Aetual/ORboard IFt PlaRe Pro><imity O~erations Trajectory. The colored trajectory data was downlinked during 
periods of ground contact. 
A sixth and entirely new exercise was appended to the end of the flight, culminating in separate orbits that would 
guarantee the trajectories would never cross again. With two healthy spacecraft remaining, the OE program was 
terminated, having completed all mission objectives and learned a great deal - both from successes and 
unanticipated problems encountered along the way. 
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D. Second Generation AR&C System 
During the three years since OE completion, Boeing has addressed AR&C issues and lessons learned from the 
flight; updated to the latest vendor sensors; improved methods for Vis-ST AR target modeling; continued improving 
upon the guidance and navigation algorithms; streamlined the simulation code; and upgraded sensor and avionics 
laboratories in Huntington Beach. and Houston. The resulting second generation AR&C hardware and software 
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expands capabilities and improves robustness in sensor tracking, sensor processing, attitude determination; 
autonomous guidance; navigation processing; modeling/simulation, and ground test/verification. The OE ground 
rules of keeping the system generic to virtually any rendezvousing spacecraft, and not requiring assistance from the 
client satellite or ground, remain. 
E. Future Missions 
OE focused on rendezvous with all types of satellites flying in virtually any orbit and attitude. To minimize 
impacts and costs to future satellite developers, complexity and mass burdens were levied upon the servicing 
spacecraft, not the client to be serviced. Features and the maturity level found in the OE-derived AR&C system are 
clearly relevant to missions requiring autonomous ~endezvous. 
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V. Future Potential For Servicing 
In this section we discuss future servicing missions and technologies required to accomplish those missions. 
A. Space Servicing Capabilities Project 
Io 2009 NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center formed the Space Servicing Capabilities Project (SSCP) to build 
on experience from the series of successful Hubble Servicing Missions and the work performed for the HRSDM 
vehicle, by studying future manned and robotic servicing applications and performing flight demonstrations of 
targeted capabilities relevant to satellite servicing. The SSCP commenced a wide-ranging study to identify servicing 
· stakeholders, including customers and technology providers, and evaluate the readiness of servicing systems, 
especially including robotics, tools, and sensing technologies. 4 The SSCP released an RFI, held an international 
workshop, identified several notional servicing missions and unique system requirements for those missions, and 
conducted several brief design exercises in the GSFC Mission Design Lab (MDL) to design servicing systems for 
each notional mission, and evaluate cost and technology readiness for those notional missions. In all, seven notional 
missions were selected that span several areas of the servicing technology space. The SSCP will submit a report to 
NASA HQ in the fall of20IO documenting the results of this study. 
In addition to executing the study, in fiscal year 2010 the SSCP commenced efforts on a series of ground and 
ISS-based demonstrations targeted towards development and verification of required new technologies identified in 
the FY2009 Study effort, and as risk mitigation for a future servicing mission. In late 2010, SSCP will deliver two 
ISS payloads to KSC. The first SSCP risk mitigation payload to ISS is a refueling demonstration payload, the 
Robotic Refueling Dextrous Demonstration (R202), which will use ISS robotics to demonstrate tools and robotics 
tasks required to refuel existing space assets via the fill and drain valves on those vehicles (note these are the ground 
access fill and drain valves, not originally designed for use in space) . . The second SSCP risk mitigation payload to 
ISS is a platform for space-based demonstration at ISS, the Dextre Pointing Package (DPP). DPP will use ISS 
robotics, and OPP-internal avionics and attitude determination sensors to actively point demonstration payloads (i.e. 
new sensors, detectors, or other technologies) at a variety of targets, including Earth-fixed, Inertial, ISS-based, or 
ISS-proximate vehicle targets, enabling inexpensive on-orbit test of a large variety of new technologies, including 
relative navigation sensors, science-enabling technologies, and other new sensor and detector technologies. 
SSCP is evaluating subsequent risk mitigation payloads to ISS, all utilizing Station Infrastructure and robotics, 
including: an extension of R2D2 to demonstrate a satellite repair task; active and passive relative navigation sensor 
demonstrations on DPP; a demonstration of autonomous capture of a non-cooperative object; and demonstration of a 
new consortium robot arm for servicing. These risk mitigation payloads, along with ongoing ground development 
and demonstrations, will advance servicing technology and demonstrate the Aerospace community's technical 
readiness to perform space servicing. 
8 . Servicing Technology Challenges 
As described in preceding pages of this paper, much of the GN&C and robotics technology required·for space 
servicing is already in place. NASA, DARPA, and the Air Force have conducted several missions demonstrating 
technology required for rendezvous proximity operations and docking (RPOD). These technologies include relative 
navigation sensing hardware, robotics hardware and algorithms, and vehicle navigation, guidance and control 
algorithms used in several manned and robotic missions. Space servicing requires extension of these capabilities to 
apply them in new orbital regimes and to new targets, including both cooperative vehicles not yet designed, and to 
cooperative and non-cooperative vehicles already on orbit. 
In the GN&C realm, autonomous capture of non-cooperative vehicles provides the most significant new 
challenge. Candidate vehicles for servicing offer a wide range of characteristics in terms of cooperation. They may 
or may not have: active systems such as two-way radios for ranging and data sharing; passive sensing aids such as 
reflectors or optical targets; capture aids such as grapple fixtures or docking mechanisms; and commandable control 
modes enabling ground controllers to optimize their orientation and configuration for capture, and perhaps most 
importantly to disable their attitude control systems during capture and stacked operations. 
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I. Relative Navigation Sensing 
Table 1 - Sensing Requirements shows typical sensing requirements as a function of range for ARPOD 
operations, as well as the sensor types used by previous missions. The table clearly shows the region where relative 
navigation sensing of non-cooperative targets has not been fully demonstrated. 
Table 1 - Sensing Requirements 
Inertial position and 
Orbit GPS R > 100m velocity Inertial Position 8-9 
Inertial accelerotion ond PropagotedAttitude and 
Orbit IMU NIA attitude rotes Position 9 
Orbit Sta.- Tracker R>2Km Cotalog Matching inertial attitude 8-9 
Acquislllon Target and chaser pseudo 
Sens°' RGPS 500m<R<35 km ond delta ranges Relative pos/vel ·8-9 
ACQUlSilion Range and beonng to 
Sensor Opticol 100m < R < 5Km target relative pos/vel 6 
Mld-Ronge Opbcal Relative position ond target rel postvel, attitude, rel 
Sensor LIDAR S0m<R<200m attitude attitude -5 
Docking Optical Relative position and target rel postvel, attitude rel 
Sensor LIDAR ••• < R < 100 m attitude attitude -5 
Numerous previous missions have demonstrated Jong-range (100s of km, far-field rendezvous) relative sensing 
of essentially non-cooperative target vehicles: Gemini, Apollo, Shuttle, Orbital Express all used angles-only 
navigation based on optical or infrared bearing measurements to a passively illuminated target, and were not 
dependent on cooperation of the target. 
At some intermediate range (about 10-20km, near-field rendezvous), most but not all previous missions acquired 
some direct range measurement, either with an RF device (Shuttle Rendezvous Radar), or a laser based device 
(Orbital express laser ranger). Again, these systems could operate in a non-cooperative mode by bouncing a signal 
off of their essentially passive target. 
At short range (less than a few km, proximity operations), most previous missions took advantage of cooperative 
targets to perform relative navigation sensing. The Space Shuttle Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS, a scanning laser 
ranger) used a retro-reflective target on Station to measure range and bearing. Orbital Express Advanced Video 
Guidance Sensor (A VGS, a laser illuminator with 20 imager) used several filtered retro-reflectors to estimate range 
and bearing at long range and relative attitude at short range. OE also used a passive vision-based sensor (VisNav), 
which took advantage of a cooperative optical target shown in Figure 15- NextSat TargetFig1m 18 ~JeKtSat Target. 
Similarly, Progress, Soyuz, and A TV all use active systems with cooperative targets or two-way RF devices at short 
range. 
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Figure 1 St-8- NextSat Target 
There are some examples of less cooperative relative navigation sensing. Space Shuttle proximity operations 
with Hubble, which prior to Servicing Mission 4 did not have cooperative targets, were performed 5 times using 
some range measurements from the Shuttle Hand Held Laser ranger, but mostly by direct observation of Hubble by 
astronauts. Orbital Express performed some proximity operations using non-cooperative sensing including laser 
ranger and silhouette feature tracking. Most significantly, Experimental Satellite System I 1 {XSS-111 performed 
several close approaches with its Minotaur upper stage and at least one other target using a scanning laser ranger. 
The XSS-11 targets did not have cooperative sensing aids. At no point did XSS-11 capture a target, however. 
More recent efforts in relative navigation sensing include several Shuttle-based experiments. The Hubble Space 
Telescope (Hsn Relative Navigation Sensor (RNS) experiment flew on Space Shuttle Atlantis on HST Servicing 
Mission 4 in May 2009 and demonstrated passive pose estimation, using monocular cameras to track HST features 
during rendezvous and deploy5 The Neptec TriDAR, consisting of three sensors in one (scanning triangulation 
device, scanning lidar, and infrared camera) flew to ISS on STS-128 and STS-131 in Aug-Sept 2009 and Apr of 
2010, respectively, and is scheduled to fly again on STS-133 in Oct 2010. TriDAR demonstrated non-cooperative 
sensing by comparing 3D point clouds of ISS to its internal model and outputting a full 6DOF pose solution (the 
first non-cooperative laser-based 6DOF pose demonstration). ASC's flash lidar (SpaceX Dragon' s primary 
Proximity operations sensor) was flown on STS-129. Finally, the Sensor Test for Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation 
(STORRM) unit will fly on STS-134, currently scheduled for early 2011. STORRM includes two of Orion's 
planned relative navigation sensors: the Ball Docking Camera and the Vision Navigation Sensor (VNS) flash lidar 
system which uses optical target (DC) and reflectors (VNS) to perform relative navigation. 
The message of this section should be clear: no spacecraft has ever performed autonomous capture of non-
cooperative vehicle, and full 6DOF relative navigation sensing to non-cooperative vehicles has been shown only to a 
limited extent (HST RNS, OE, TriDAR DTO). Clearly further work is required to establish a robust, lighting-
insensitive solution for all orbit regimes. 
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Acronyms 
AAS American Astronautical Society 
AFSCN Air Force Space Communications Network 
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
AR&C Autonomous Rendezvous and Capture 
ASTRO Autonomous Space Transport Robotic Operations 
AVGS Advanced Video Guidance Sensor 
OAP OijUtal AutoPilot 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
HST Hubble Soace Telescope 
km Kilometer(s) 
m Meter(s) 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OE Orbital Express 
R2D2 Robotic Refueling Dexterous Demonstration 
R-Bar Radial Vector 
RPOD Rendezvous, Proximity Ooerations, and Docking 
RSC Research, Development. Test, and Evaluation Suoport Center 
s Second(s) 
STP-1 Space Test Program l 
STS Space Transportation System 
SM Servicing Mission 
SSCP Space Servicing Capabilities PrQject 
STORRM Sensor Test for Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation 
TORS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
V-Bar Velocity Vector 
Vis-STAR Vision-based Software for Track, Attitude, and Ranging 
XSS-ll Experimental Satellite System 11 
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